

**EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY IN PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS OF UGANDA: THE CASE OF MBALE DISTRICT LOCAL
GOVERNMENT**

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I Saano Anthony Doreen hereby declare that this submission is my original proposal towards the award of a Degree in Public Administration and Management and that to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published by another person nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree of the University, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

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


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APPROVAL

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DEDICATION

This research exercise is dedicated to my family for all their tremendous support and unflinching love shown to me all through my academic pursuit. Their effort and support are very much cherished and appreciated.

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ABSTRACT

The study explored the effect of corruption on the social service delivery in Mbale district local government (BDLG). Also the specific objectives of the study were; to examine the relationship between bribe, nepotism, favouritism and service delivery of BDLG. A cross section research was carried out which involved the use of quantitative analysis. Data was collected by the use of questionnaires and interview guides. The study sampled 80 respondents from four sub counties out of 100 of targeted populations. The sample size was determined using Sample size determination (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970). Data was analysed using SPSS. 16. Overversion. The data was analysed using both descriptive and inference statistics where it concluded about the variables with respect to the objectives. The coefficient of correlation between corruption and social service delivery was positively low (0.0 187). The study further found out that there was a negative relationship between corruption and social service delivery. The researcher recommends the government to always carry out department4l performance reviews and the ministry should carry out an assessment of the procedures/processes with the aim of identifying

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LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

| | | |
|------|---|---|
| SPSS | : | Statistical package for social scientists |
| DV | : | Dependent Variable |
| IV | : | Independent Variable |
| MDGs | : | Millennium Development Goals |
| SDGs | : | Sustainable Development Goals |
| AAV | : | ANOVA Analysis of Variance |
| SAQ | : | Self-Administered Questionnaire |
| MDLG | : | Mbale District Local Government |
| USE | : | Universal Secondary Education |
| UPE | : | Universal Primary Education |

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter entails the historical background of the study, contextual, theoretical, conceptual, statement of the problem, purpose, objectives, research questions and hypothesis, scope significance and operational definitions of the key terms in the study.

1.1. Background of the Study

1.1.1 Historical Background

Globally, the term service delivery is a popular phrase that is used to denote the distribution of basic communal needs and services, notably housing, water and sanitation, land, electricity and infrastructure, which local communities have taken for granted and become dependent on for their daily existence. However, in the South going Am upkeep of these basic services have proved to be unreliable at times, greatly inconveniencing and endangering local communities. The resultant response, particularly in the past decade, has been increasing ‘service delivery protests’ or protest (2012a; Dassah 2012; Reddy 2010).

In Africa, Political infighting and related clashes between the political and management components in local government in South Africa have also adversely affected municipal service delivery. It is a given that the public sector in an African context has always been deemed to be political in nature and South Africa is no exception (Booyesen 2012a; Cameron 2003; 2010; De Visser 2010). On a more practical and realistic level, there have also been challenges experienced relative to the political administrative interface at the local sphere. South Africa as a democratic state has only been in existence for just over two decades and is a young democracy (Ndudula 2013:3). The local sphere of government is particularly crucial as it signifies grassroots governance and local democracy, which are considered to be closest to the people, and more importantly, it is at the coalface relative to the delivery of basic services.

In East Africa, among the many challenges facing public service institutions in East African,

corruption remains one of the most pervasive and the least confronted (Afro barometer in Tanzania, 2006). Donor agencies and their clients accepted the inevitability of corruption in public service delivery; it was at worst a ne the wheels of economic development (Mkwawa, 2004). In recent years, however, consensus has emerged that corruption is a central challenge to equitable and sustainable development. A growing body of research suggests that corruption and rent seeking shrink the range of opportunities available to developing countries as investments become less productive, the cost of capital increases, and private investment, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid all decline (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Wei, 1999). Donors are increasingly sponsoring research on corruption (including in their own projects), and many have created units dedicated to providing assistance to developing countries for assessing and responding to corruption-related problems. Many of these research and support activities, however, are not very helpful to individuals working on public service reform at the level. Whereas curbing corruption requires understanding and action at both the policy and the institutional levels, most research and advice focuses on the former. Anti-corruption programs sponsored by development agencies emphasize macro-level initiatives such as economic and sector policy reforms (e.g., liberalizing trade and reducing subsidies) and transformation of critical institutions such as the judiciary (Kaufmann, 1998; OECD, 1999; World Bank, 1997).

In Uganda, According to Mbabazi (2015:54), U corruption dilemma emanated from the British colonial administrative system, which was based on using a segment of the local population to rule over the rest and consequently rewarded them for supporting their policies and interests. With the intentioned absence of democratic rule, institutions that could condemn and demand accountability from public officials never developed. Kiddu (2014) sees corrupt colonial policies through the lens of the oppressive political, economic and legal structures they instituted to exploit Ugandans. The colonial officials were never accountable to the natives; they only provided feedback to the distant colonial office and Parliament in London. The natives were not permitted to question the actions of their colonial chiefs. The populace was simply recruited to serve the interests of their masters, who rewarded them based on how well they supported their policies. Hence, such opaque governance promoted corruptive abuse of power.

1.1.2. Theoretical Background

The study is developed by the Principal of Agent Theory; the predominant theory of corruption within both political science and economics today is the principal-agent theory. This theory was coined by Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick in 1973. The theory examines relationships as a tension between the “Principal” who demands agent is responsible for detecting the needs of the patients and subsequently providing the best treatment in terms of quality (Kayode et al., 2013). The agent competence in treating a patient is based on different components like interpersonal skills and ability to transfer information. On the other hand, principal quality of health services is positively r information to the patients. The theory argues that both principal and agent are motivated by rational self- interest. The connection of the theory to this study is how the principal and agent can manage their self- interests (Kayode et al., 2013). The problem arises not only just from conflict of interest but also from the privileged access of the principal to information which is the problem of asymmetric information. The agents who have been employed to provide a service will tend to use their superior knowledge for personal or private gains. The theory has been applied to the public sector, focusing attention on problems of accountability and transparency created by asymmetric information flows between agents and principals, which lead to problems such as corruption in health service delivery (Keil, 2013).

1.1.3 Conceptual Background

In this study, corruption is the independent variable whereas service delivery is the dependent variable. The variables are conceptualised below according to different scholars, sources among others. According to (Carlos Samitier, 2016) Service delivery is the direct counterpart of service provisioning; they represent together a customer to provider relationship. How operational applications can be specified in terms of requirements and consequently provisioned as communication services was discussed in the previous part. The present part describes how these specified services can be delivered with the required qualities by a telecom service provider, and in particular, -housebytelecomtheinfrastructure,utility’sstaff,andprocessesin. Service here implies tangible and intangible goods and services provided by the government in order to improve the well- being of the citizenry. Carlson et al. (2005) conceptualised service delivery as the relationship between policy makers, service providers 3 and poor people. According to them, it encompasses services and their supporting systems that are typically regarded as a state responsibility. These include social services (primary education and basic health services), infrastructure (water,

sanitation, roads and bridges) and services that promote personal security (justice, police among others) Social services delivery is driven by innovation (Stephen Moore, 2010). It depends on the ability of social work researchers and practitioners to find innovative solutions to the problems they face. Innovation entails the creation, adaptation, and adoption of new approaches to services delivery. The most fundamental type of innovation is the creation of a new service product. However, innovations in the way services are delivered are equally important.

According to Sogema (2013), Social service delivery focuses on closing the gaps between needs, policy and performance to ensure the social service needs of a population are met in a responsive, accountable, and sustainable manner. Sogema has delivered large-scale development initiatives related to community and rural development programs improving citizen engagement for gender responsive, accountable, and improved social service delivery, including health care, water services, and education. Social service delivery according to Muzaale (2009) include; family planning programmes, youth service programmes, public health and health education programmes, soil conservation and afforestation programmes, meteorological data, devices of social monitoring and the early warning signals they might provide, and the steps taken to encourage the production and maintenance of buffer stocks, as well as to promote famine-insurance crops, such as cassava. As can be seen, preventive social services are highly diverse and, accordingly, demand the coordinative contribution of the social development practitioner. Preventive social services are hypothesised to reduce the vulnerability of especially rural households and communities, by increasing their ability to absorb episodic shocks that may occur within their environments.

In Kenya, the Anti-Corruption and Economic crime Act (2003) has defined corruption as: an offence under any of the provision of section 39 to 44, 46 and 47, bribery or fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public goods, abuse of office or breach of trust or an offence involving dishonesty in connection with any rate or imposed levy under any act or 4 under any written law relating to the elevation of persons to public office. Corruption as envisaged in the act is multifaceted hence it affects all sectors thus posing a major challenge to governments and individuals. Different authors have classified corruption into different typologies. A few of the typologies include: petty or grand, administrative or political, passive or active, a way of life or a fact of life, incidental, systemic or systematic and well-organized or chaotic (UNDP, 2008, Quah, 2007, Kpundeh, 1998, Mauro, 1998). In Kenya, corruption in the public sector is classified either

as petty or grand (KACC, 2007) and in some instances it has been considered as systemic. Petty corruption is perpetrated by the junior officers in the public sector who demand for favors in form of cash or in kind from the public before they can offer services (Nyaga & Theuri, 2011). This type of corruption has become so common that it has been taken as an intrinsic part of the day to day transactions in some government offices (KACC, 2007). Grand corruption targets public resources, for example embezzlement of public funds through procurement contracts and tenders, grabbing of public land, non-collection or non-remittance of government revenue or payment of non — existence goods or services. Systemic corruption as it has been entrenched within the government systems where individuals in position of power misuse their positions for their own personal gain.

According to a survey done by KACC (2007) there are government departments where corruption is so entrenched such that paying a bribery is the norm and not the exception. Bribery is an illegal act involving the exchange of consideration, such as money, with the purpose of influencing behaviour. Briberies are often made to public officials or heads of other regulatory agencies to escape legal convictions or unfavourable rulings or as an incentive for the payee to alter or overlook pertinent regulations that would otherwise restrict the payer. According to Adisa (2003) corruption or corrupt practices has to do with fraudulent activities especially siphoning of funds that are meant for the gen with this, Osoba (1996) defines corruption as an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms a improve the living condition of the people. A concise definition is given by USAID (2003:3) that corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. From the definitions, we see that corruption is a selfish and dishonest act that 5 deprives a vast majority (apart from the perpetrators and their cohorts) of desire benefits that is; social, economic, political, and other legitimate benefits.

1.1.4 Contextual Background

The research intended to be carried in Mbale district because of the rampant growth of corruption rates. According to the report Mbale district is ranked number 44th among the most corrupt districts in Uganda thus causing counter accusations among the local leaders, technocrats and other stake holders. Jafari Basajjabalaba; the district chairperson says the report is very true but accused the technical wing led by the chief administrative officer Elias Byamungu of failure to do their work efficiently. He said that the office reporting corruption in the district and how the past regime of Wills Bashaasha and former CAO Lillian Nakamatte mishandled the local government funds but no response was made. Mbale inherited a regime that was too rotten and corrupt so we petitioned the IGG, Solicitor General plus the president's I think basing office on our complaints,

to this come f is a reason why the IGG ranked the district 44th among corrupt districts. Basajjabalaba further accused the works department lead by the district Eng. Banabus Mbonimpa of doing shoddy work and extorting money from the locals to work on their private roads using government equipment. Mbale District Local Government has spent two years without a District Service Commission (DSC), a situation which has crippled service delivery in the district. The failure to constitute the DSC has been blamed on the confusion by the political leadership. The impasse has exacerbated manpower shortage in the district. Mbale Chief Administrative Officer Elias Byainungu says they want to recruit primary school teachers but there is no DSC to do the work. For example, 64 primary school teachers at the district and 24 teachers at the municipal council were not recruited in the Financial Year 2022/23 yet the central government had sent the money to cater -for the exercise. Mbale district has now lost Shs3 billion that has not been utilized. There are gaps in the human resource; the district has no planning unit, chief finance officer, auditors in the municipal council and several heads of departments. We lack 100 teachers yet the money says Mr there,".Byamungu. Staffson probation has not been confirmed into the service and those who are supposed to get promotions have not been elevated due to lack of a DSC. This has affected staff motivation, which effects negatively on service delivery (Daily Monitor, 22 June 2017). 6 The report, which was conducted between 2016 and 2018 in Mbale, Kyenjojo, Kumi, Iganga, Mbale and Kayunga districts by the Initiative for Social and Economic Rights (ISER), an NGO, focused on citizen participation on water user committees (WUCs), health units' management committees (HUMCs) and schools presenting the findings of the report in Kampala last week, ISER programmes director Angella Nabwowe Kasule said they found out that the 58 % of the respondents said their village water user committees were non-functional and

80 % of those interviewed on health service delivery revealed they have not accessed any meetings of HUMCs. The report also reveals that 65 % of those interviewed on education service delivery said there were functional SMCs in their communities. “We found that most of the service in the urban centres, hence the rural poor facing accessibility challenges. The best hospitals, schools and water sources are near the district h water user committee (WUCs) functionality, Mbale District lagged behind, with 85% of its WUCs non-functional, followed by Kyenjojo at 68% and Mbale at 65%.

1.2 Problem Statement

In the last two decades, the Ugandan government introduced a number of reforms aimed at improving performance, enhancing service delivery and promoting transparency and accountability In the public sector service delivery and governance by local communities, local governments are still grappling with a range of challenges, namely, inadequate local financial resources and over-reliance on conditional central government grants; inability to attract and retain sufficient trained and experienced staff; corruption, nepotism, and elite capture. With regard to the specific services, while universal primary education (UPE) policy under the decentralization framework is credited with a dramatic increase Of 3.25% in primary school enrolment, public primary education services are still dogged by concerns over financing, equity, quality, and the need for curriculum reform.

However, service delivery in Uganda shows a reduction by 3% since 2017 (UBOS, 2018) compared to 2015 and 2014 with 9.3% this could have been caused by poor governance, planning among others especially in the rural districts which have registered a decrease in social service delivery particularly in health where there is has been a reduction in crude death rate, Infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, increase in life expectancy. Education such as teaching and learning resources, quality education, Promotion of UPE and USE education system, learning achievements and outcomes. Transportation services indicated by stability in transport costs, provision of new transport means such as air transport among others. However, two decades since the introduction of public sector reform programs, there is still a significant gap between what the government is offering and the public expectations. Some studies show that there has been no improvement in health services with many health status indicators either stagnating or worsening

dues to the increased death rates in 2022 by 0.8% from 2019. In general, decentralization of education and health services has not resulted in greater participation of the ordinary people and accountability of service providers to the community. Regarding agricultural extension and advisory services, except for areas serviced by NGOs, the majority of the districts such as Mbale do not readily access extension services, because districts have been unable to prioritize the operational expenses. With the basement of the status above and its causes of service delivery, Evaluation of the service delivery in the district indicated that Land administration and management processes are long, demand driven, complex with many actors who have monopoly and discretion powers. This study ought to examine the effects of corruption on social service delivery; a case study of Mbale district local government.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study is to find out the effects of corruption on service delivery in Mbale district local government.

1.4 Specific objectives of the study

- i. To examine the relationship between bribery and service delivery in Mbale district local government.
- ii. To find out the relationship between nepotism and service delivery in Mbale district local government.
- iii. To establish the relationship between Favouritism and service delivery in Mbale district local government.

1.5 Research Questions

- i. What is the relationship between bribery and health services in Mbale district local government?
- ii. To what extent is nepotism affecting education services in Mbale district local government?
- iii. What is the relationship between Favouritism and agriculture services in Mbale district local government?

1.7 Scope of the Study

1.7.1 Content scope

The study contained the relationship between corruption and service delivery in Mbale district local government. Where corruption is the independent variable and service delivery is the dependent variable. It also contained the forms of corruption in Mbale district local government and the services delivered by Mbale district local government.

1.7.2 Geographical Scope

The study was carried out in Mbale District local government. Mbale District Local Government is located in the eastern region of Uganda, approximately 245 kilometers east of Kampala, the capital city. Its geographical coordinates are approximately 1°4'0"N 34°10'0"E. The current leadership of Mbale District Local Government includes a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who is the administrative head of the district. Other key officials include the District Chairperson, the District Speaker, and the District Executive Committee, which is made up of various department heads and officials responsible for different aspects of local governance. The CAO plays a pivotal role in the overall administration of the district, overseeing various departments and ensuring the efficient delivery of services to the residents of Mbale District.

1.7.3 Time scope

The study considered the period 2019 –2023. This is because bribery, nepotism, and favoritism are detrimental forms of corruption that have plagued the ministry of local government in Uganda, undermining its effectiveness and eroding public trust.

1.7.4 Theoretical Scope

The study was developed by the Principal of Agent Theory as it relates the variables in the study (corruption and social services delivery).The predominant theory of corruption within both political science and economics today is the principal-agent theory. This theory was coined by Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick in 1973. The theory examines relationships as a tension between

the “Principal” who demands a service responsible for detecting the needs of the patients and subsequently providing the best treatment in terms of quality.

1.8 Significance of the Study

The research helped the researcher to attain Statistics since it's a partial fulfilment department of Economics and Applied Statistics. The findings of this study was useful to stakeholders both in the public and private sectors to provide solutions in curbing different forms of corruption which obstruct social service delivery in Mbale and other organizations. To the district, hospital services and facilities that are meant to be provided to the public for free was followed up by district officials who are responsible for the health sector to see that there is no exploitation of patients by the doctors and nurses. Through this, the health status of Mbale district as a whole will improve. This study is hoped to provide the government with information about the corruption rate within Mbale district and a follow up of social service delivery of the district.

1.9 Operational definitions of the key terms in the study

The researcher defines various terms according to her perception. These are defined as follows. Corruption is defined as abuse or misuse of public office and funds for personal gain. In this study, focus on corruption is put on the public servants and at the district level. Bribery according to this study is an illegal act involving the exchange of consideration, such as money, with the purpose of influencing behaviour. Nepotism according to this study is the practice among those with power or influence of favouring relatives or friends, especially by giving those jobs.

Favouritism according to this study refers to group especially partiality in awarding advantages to friends or trusted colleagues than others.


Health according to this study is the state of being free from any illness injury or other mental and body attacks. Education according to this study is the process of receiving and giving information or systematic instructions amongst people especially in schools, universities or even institutions.

10 Transport in this study refers to a system or means of carrying people or goods from one place to another.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

Figure 1.1 below gives a graphical conceptual representation of the variables of study and how they related to one another. The independent variable was corporate governance while the dependent variable was services delivery.

Figure 1.1. A conceptual framework shows the effect of corruption on service delivery in public institutions of Uganda.



Source: Researcher 2024

According to the diagram above, bribery, nepotism and favouratism were identified as forms of corruption that influence service delivery in public service organizations. Mwanzia and Wong (2011) say that accountability among public organizations ensures that officials in public institutions are answerable for their actions and that there is redress when goals and commitments are met. Accountability ensures actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to

oversight so as to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to be benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance and service delivery. Compliance, these are techniques and policies put in place and must be adhered to in the execution of duties and tasks assigned. They are within the establishment act. On the other hand, Okpara (2011) says that transparency in public organizations involves engaging all stakeholders in a round table in order to aid the smooth flow of information in order to achieve a common goal and removing doubts among the stakeholders. In the ministry of local government in Uganda, these forms of corruption have had far-reaching effects on governance, service delivery, and public trust. The prevalence of bribery has led to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and implementation of development projects, as decisions are often made based on kickbacks rather than the public interest. The impact of nepotism is evident in the staffing and promotion processes within the ministry, where qualified and deserving candidates are overlooked in favor of individuals with personal connections to those in power. This has resulted in a demotivated workforce and diminished productivity.

1.9 Definitions of Operational terms

Public Services

Public services are the services provided by governments and are mainly funded through taxation or revenue collected by governments from its people.

Performance contract

A performance contract is a management tool that entails the rating of actual achievements against performance targets negotiated and agreed upon at the beginning of the financial year.

Corruption

Corruption is a serious problem in the world. It affects health service and other social services. It is also argued that corruption is not simply a problem of the indiscipline officials, but the failure in delivering the objectives of good governance (UN, 2016; Gaal et al., 2006).

Population

Population refers to the totality of all elements in the study

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter includes a review of textbook, journal and relevant literature like presentations at conferences about the effects of corruption on service delivery. This chapter discusses studies conducted by other researchers, what they have said about the related studies and the gaps they have left in the scope.

2.1. The relationship between bribery and service delivery in local government

The predominant theory of corruption within both political science and economics today is the principal-agent theory. This theory was coined by Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick in 1973. The theory examines relationships as a tension between the “Principal” and the “Agent” who provides it. The agent is responsible for subsequently providing the best treatment in terms of quality (Kayode et al., 2013). The agent's competence in treating a patient is based on different components like interpersonal skills and ability to transfer information.

On the other hand, principal quality of health transfer information to the patients. The theory argues that both principal and agent are motivated by rational self-interest. The connection of the theory to this study is how the principal and agent can manage their self-interests (Kayode et al., 2013). The problem arises not only just from conflict of interest but also from the privileged access of the principal to information which is the problem of asymmetric information. The agents who have been employed to provide a service will tend to use their superior knowledge for personal or private gains.

Rational choice theory, also known as choice theory or rational action theory is a framework for understanding and often formally modelling social and economic behaviour. The basic premise of rational choice theory is that aggregate social behaviour results from the behaviour of individual actors, each of whom is making their individual decisions. The theory also focuses on the determinants of the individual choices (methodological individualism).¹² Rational choice theories then assume that an individual has preferences among the available choice alternatives that allow

them to state which option they prefer. These preferences are assumed to be complete (the person can always say which of two alternatives they consider preferable or that neither is preferred to the other) and transitive (if option A is preferred over option B and option B is preferred over option C, then A is preferred over C).

The rational agent is assumed to take account of available information, probabilities of events, and potential costs and benefits in determining preferences, and to act consistently in choosing the self-determined best choice of action. Rationality is widely used as an assumption of the behaviour of individuals in microeconomic models and analyses and appears in almost all economics textbook treatments of human decision-making. It is also used in political science, sociology and philosophy. A particular version of rationality is instrumental rationality, which involves seeking the most cost effective means to achieve a specific goal without reflecting on the worthiness of that goal. Gary Becker was an early proponent of applying rational actor models more widely. Becker won the 1992 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his studies of discrimination, crime, and human capital.

Pareto's idea of welfare made an immense being regarded as one of the necessary condition idea is not perfect since it is not free from criticisms. Here there is no scope for value judgment because it accepts the ordinal measurement of utility. And also there is no more scope for interpersonal comparison of utility movement. Simply in society can be regarded as welfare even in the case of increasing of welfare of at least one and should not reduce the welfare of anyone in a complex when welfare of one increases along with that welfare of others decreases. In such cases the optimality and the efficiency idea of Pareto represented using Samuelsson's indifference understanding of (Pareto's welfare is not free from criterion criticism even though it is regarded as a revolutionary idea in welfare economics. Some of the critical evaluation point has mentioned. Firstly, the idea is not completely free from value judgments. The reason for saying this is that, the idea puts a condition that none of the individual should not get worse off is actually a case of value judgment. In many of the cases of redistribution of wealth or income, somebody should suffer for the betterment of others. Governments are doing such policies to protect the democratic functioning as well as to reduce the level of inequality in the society. But Pareto failed to judge this condition of increasing and decreasing of welfare together in the society.

Public services are the services provided by governments and are mainly funded through taxation or revenue collected by governments from its people. In this study the public services were those services offered in the Ministry of Lands which included: Land Policy formulation and implementation, administration and management of Government and Trust 14 Land, registration of titles deeds, land valuation, resolution of land and boundary disputes, supervision and facilitation of Land Control Boards and Land Tribunals. Others include ascertainment and protection of land rights, settlement of poor landless Kenyans, land surveying and production of maps, maintenance and inspection of international boundaries and preparation of national, regional and local physical development (Ministry of Lands Service Charter).

2.2. The relationship between nepotism and service delivery in local government

A performance contract is a management tool for measuring negotiated performance targets (GoK, 2006). The performance contract specifies the mutual performance obligations, intentions and the responsibilities of the two parties (AKaranga, 2008). A Performance contract spells out clearly the desired outputs expected of the public official who has signed the contract. Performance evaluation for each public agency is based on the signed performance contract and the Annual Performance Report. It entails the rating of actual achievements against performance targets negotiated and agreed upon at the beginning of the financial year.

Corruption is a serious problem in the world. It affects health service and other social services. It is also argued that corruption is not simply a problem of the indiscipline officials, but the failure in delivering the objectives of good governance (UN, 2016; Gaal et al., 2006). Corruption is one of the key underlying factors that seriously undermine the quality of good governance in both developing and developed countries. The lack of good governance generally implies weak institutions, ineffective checks and balances, inadequate regulatory and legal frameworks, and poor enforcement mechanisms which are all factors that incite corruption (UN, 2016; Olken, 2009).

Fighting corruption in the local governments is a complex challenge. The UNDP (2011) reports absenteeism, theft of medical supplies, informal payments, weak regulatory procedures, opaque and improperly designed procurement procedures, diversion of supplies in the distribution system for private gains and embezzlement of health care funds as common corrupt practices in many

developing countries. In addition, the burden of corruption in the health sector mostly affects the poor, due to their limited access to resources (Vian, 2010; Women's Dignity P 2004).

This indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as interests. It also measures the strength and framework to prevent and combat corruption. Corruption hinders economic growth by increasing costs, lowering productivity, discouraging investment, reducing confidence in public institutions, limiting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, weakening systems of public financial management, and undermining investments in health and education. Corruption can also increase poverty by slowing economic growth, skewing government expenditure in favour of the rich and well-connected, concentrating public investment in unproductive projects, promoting a more regressive tax system, siphoning funds away from essential public services, adding a higher level of risk to the investment decisions of low-income individuals, and reinforcing patterns of unequal asset ownership, thereby limiting the ability of the poor to borrow and increase their income(Mukasa,2017).

Two of the destroying agents of our country is favouritism and bribery. Why is there so much corruption in our country? It is staring in our faces while we stand by, frozen in the hard ice of favouritism and we think it is just so cool. Is corruption so rampant because to favouritism if so, where does it start? This article is not intended to be a scholarly work on the ethology of favouritism, nor is it a thesis on creating a non-violent environment. It is just a friendly conversation warning you, dear reader, about the silent Bahamian killer favouritism. Jay Hailey (2016), an online author states: "Favouritism members in the position to demand cuts, bribes of many transactions. Because you know the leader will not obey the law and will allow his relatives and favourites to conduct shady practices, the amounts of bribes demanded by family members will go up and up and involve more and more. A bribery is an illegal act involving the exchange of consideration, such as money, with the purpose of influencing behaviour. Bribes are given made to public officials or heads of other regulatory agencies to escape legal convictions or unfavourable rulings or as an incentive for the payee to alter or overlook pertinent regulations that would otherwise restrict the payer (Will Kenton, 2018). Bribes occur in many forms, ranging from minor transactions between 16 individuals to major deals between corporations and/or

governments. Briberies can also be masked as tips, gifts, favours, donations, et al. There is no universal definition or classification system for bribery as some nations approve of and legalize certain transactions that are illegal elsewhere.

Education should contribute to social cohesion in that schools ought to teach the rules of the game: those that govern interpersonal and political action. They consist of the social and legal principles underpinning good citizenship, obligations of political leaders, behaviour expected of citizens, and consequences for not adhering to these principles. Schools can also facilitate a student's appreciation for the complexity of issues related to historical and global current events and, in so doing, may increase the likelihood that a student will see a point of view other than his or her own. By teaching the rules of the game in this manner, schools foster tolerance and lay the groundwork for voluntary behaviour consistent with social norms (Thomas Jefferson, 2009).

Health services have the functions to define community health problems, to identify unmet needs and survey the resources to meet them and to project administrative actions to accomplish the purpose of proposed action programs. For maximum efficacy, health systems should rely on newer approaches of management as management-by-objectives, risk management, and performance management with full and equal participation from professionals and consumers (Libyan J. Mcd, 2008). The public should be well informed about their needs and what is expected from them to improve their health. Inefficient use of budget allocated to health services should be prevented by tools like performance management and clinical governance. Data processed to information and intelligence is needed to deal with changing disease patterns and to encourage policies that could manage with the complex feedback system of health. E-health solutions should be instituted to increase effectiveness and improve efficiency and informing human resources and populations. Suitable legislations should be introduced including those that ensure coordination between different sectors.

Every day, governments, businesses, and individuals make many transportation investments and decisions about the use of transportation. Location and development decisions are also heavily influenced by transportation. People often use transportation data in making these decisions. In making public policy, it would be very useful to know the value of an extra dollar invested in

transportation. It would be useful to know where, geographically and modally, to invest that dollar. It would also be useful to be able to track gross domestic product (GDP). Consumers are probably most interested in price indexes: the price of gas, the price of cars, or the fares for different modes. Financial and business interests are interested in productivity measures.

2.3. The relationship between favouritism and service delivery in local government

In assessing service delivery using the performance contract signed and the annual performance report by the government agencies, it should be noted that there is no direct accountability of the public service employee to the service consumers. This is because the government has taken the role of service provision and at the same time assessor of the services offered. There are three major channels through which corruption can adversely affect the provision and delivery of health services. Firstly, corruption drives up prices and lowers the level of government output and services, including the provision and financing of the health care services. Secondly, it reduces investment in human capital and thirdly, it reduces government revenues, which in turn lower the quality of public services (Dridi, 2013, Gupta et al., 2000; Vian, 2007; Sahin et al., 2009). Corruption is a cultural phenomenon because it depends on how a society understands the rules and what constitutes a deviation.

Armstrong et al (2018) conducted a study with the main purpose of the performance contracting is to ensure efficiency and effective service delivery to the public in a transparent and accountable manner. A contract is a management tool for measuring negotiated performance targets. The performance contract specifies the mutual performance obligations, intentions and the responsibilities of the two parties. A Performance contract spells out clearly the desired outputs expected of the public official who has signed the contract. Performance evaluation for each public agency is based on the signed performance contract and the Annual Performance Report. It entails the rating of actual achievements against performance targets negotiated and agreed upon at the beginning of the financial year. Michelle (2017) conducted a study about service delivery and corruption in public services where she provides micro level evidence of how past institutions impact present economic outcomes. It looks at the impact of colonial land tenure institutions on local governance and education outcomes in western Uganda. Outcomes are worse in villages that belong to areas with a history of concentration of power with the elites. Such areas continue to retain a greater political presence of socially and economically dominant classes. Future research

should examine the success of policies that attempt to break such persistence through empowerment of no elite groups.

According to Warnbua et al (2016) who conducted a study on corruption and service delivery, the study found out that, there was a negative correlation between the two. The findings showed that child mortality rates were about 33.3 percent higher in countries with high levels of corruption than in countries whose levels were low. In addition, infant mortality rates and percent of low birth weight babies were almost twice as high while, school dropouts were five times high. The study was carried out in the health and education sectors using cross country data. The corruption data was based on TI corruption perception indices. This study relied on annual corruption data obtained by the Anti -Corruption agencies in Kenya as perceived by members of the public while; the study was carried out in the Ministry of Lands in the Land sector.

Ainonga (2015) carried out the study about Corruption in the health sector is unquestionably a threat to the quality of health services. How health services delivery is not sufficiently explored. This study aimed at assessing perceptions of corruption in the health sector in Mbeya Urban District. Using a questionnaire, data were collected from a sample of 180 respondents where by 91 (50.6%) were males and 89 (49.4%) were females. Furthermore, key informant interviews were used to compliment information on perceptions of corruption. A statistically significant difference between perceptions of corruption and marital status at 5% level of significance. Single respondents perceived higher corruption in the health sector compared to the married ones. In addition, long queue was the major factor driving corruption during health service delivery.

Mwakisu (2015) conducted a study about educated officials on corruption. Clients with non-formal education are likely to report more effects of corruption than those with formal education because those with formal education are more likely to have networking. Corruption is also likely to have more effects on those employed in the informal sector than those in the formal sector because those employed in the formal sector are likely to be aware of their rights as well as networking. In addition, women are likely to be affected more than men because of their special health needs.

Jane Nyandia Mama (2014), conducted a research on the Impact of corruption on service delivery

in the ministry of lands, (2008-2013). The purpose of this study was to establish the impact of corruption on service delivery in the Ministry of Lands. The trend of corruption and performance in service delivery for the Ministry of Lands was examined before the impact was established. It is argued that corruption leads to an increase in the cost of public goods and loss of revenue both of which lead to poor service delivery. The study uses secondary data from Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting secretariat for the period 2008 to 2013. The corruption trend over the period assumed a second degree polynomial (quadratic) functional structure while, service delivery trend assumed a linear function. A negative correlation between corruption and service delivery in the ministry of Lands.

2.5 Research Gaps

In the review of the literature developed by different researchers, gaps have been identified. The literature review provides explanations on how corruption affects social service delivery but most of the studies have not been carried out within Uganda and particularly in the rural settings of the country despite the fact that the country is among the African countries being affected with high corruption rates.

The current study therefore identified gaps of limited research about social service delivery in Uganda and thus aimed at examining the determinants of social service delivery in the country particularly Mbale district. The study will employ a descriptive research design to examine the factors that contributed to social service delivery.

The current study compared 20 findings using descriptive, regression and correlation analyses to come to conclusions. This study will serve to bridge the gap of limited literature about social service delivery in Uganda and providing relationships between corruption and social service delivery in Mbale district local government, Uganda.

The researcher also identified a gap in time or years within which most of the researchers carried out researches on the same problem. With the changing Uganda, some researches are inapplicable since currently social service delivery is determined by some other indicators not in the previous years, thus a study in Mbale district about the effect of corruption on social service delivery. The

study will also cover the contextual gap. This is because the research was done in the rural areas unlike other studies that are being carried out in other foreign countries moreover in urban areas.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter indicates how data was collected, processed and analyzed. It contains sampling design, data collection methods and instruments that was used in data processing, analyzing and presentation. It also contains the problems that are likely to be faced in the study.

3.1 Research design

A cross section research was carried out which involved qualitative and use of quantitative analysis .This was aided by the use of interviews and questionnaires respectively. A correlation study was used since the researcher was interested in finding out the effect corruption on social service delivery.

3.2 Study population Study

Population refers to the totality of all elements in the study. The study population included sample population of 100 respondents from four subcounties of Mbale district. The subcounties included; Bufumbo, Bungokho, Busiu, Nakaloke and Wanale. Whereby Civil servants from health sector, Education sector, transport sector and even the households heads.

3.3 Sample Size and Design

In the study, a stratified random sampling tecimique was used to reach the respondents in all the four sub counties of the district. The study sampled 80 respondents from four sub counties out of 100 targeted populations.

Table 3.1 Respondents and the sample Sizes by each sub county.

| Sub-county | Number of respondents | Respondents sampled |
|------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Bufumbo | 35 | 28 |
| Bungokho | 25 | 20 |
| Nakaloke | 20 | 16 |
| Wanale | 100 | 80 |
| Busiu | 20 | 16 |

Source: Sample size determination (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970)

3.4.1 Primary sources

This was originally collected from the various categories of respondents using self-administered questionnaires for the case of household heads and face to face interviews (civil servants from health sector, transport sector and transport sector) during the study.

3.5 Data collection methods and instruments

3.5.1 Questionnaires

The researcher used self-administered questionnaires consisting of questions which were both open and closed ended. This enabled respondent to provide adequate information required by the researcher in order to make the necessary findings and recommendations of the study.

3.5.2 Interview guides

The researcher conducted a face to face interview with the respondents in order to collect adequate information required in the study. This method of data collection was selected because it helped in providing more accurate and reliable information

3.6 Data processing, analysis and presentation

Raw data from the field was edited and coded with the view of ensuring completeness.

Editing was done to ensure that data from the respondents is accurate, reliable and consistent. Coding of edited responses in numerical terms for easy analysis using SPSS. The researcher analysed data collected from the study using a 4-linkert scale as the basis of measurement percentages and frequencies. The analysis majorly displayed descriptive statistics, means and frequencies and statistical method of Pearson used to determine the relationship between variable.

3.7 Validity and reliability of the instrument

Cronbach alpha (Cronbach, 1951) reliability coefficient of 0.6 points and above was used to measure the internal consistency or average correlation of items in a survey instrument to gauge its reliability. The higher the score, the more reliable the generated scale is. In this study, 0.7 alpha coefficients was an acceptable reliability coefficient. Therefore, the data about the questionnaire was reliable.

3.8 Limitations of the study

Failure to answer questions because it was considered time consuming for the respondents. Lack of cooperation from respondents, especially those who consider the information confidential and thought the survey is for purposes of revenue collection. The researcher therefore assured the respondents of confidentiality of their information that it is solely for academic purpose for which it is used. Insufficient financial resources in terms of transport and stationery costs. However, the researcher endeavoured to use personal resources to ensure the research is completed.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presented the data analysis and presentation of results about the effects of corruption on service delivery in Mbale district local government. The analysis dealt with the descriptive statistics about the forms of corruption such as nepotism, bribe and favouritism, The study also looked at the relationship between variables in the study using the linear regression analysis.

4.1. Distribution of Respondent's General Information

This section presented the gender of respondents, age and the level of education of the respondents in the sampling frame

Table 4 4 4: Respondents' General Information

| Characteristics | | Frequency | Percentage |
|-----------------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| Sex | Male | 45 | 56.2 |
| | Female | 35 | 43.8 |
| | | | |
| Age Group | Less than 25 | 21 | 26.2 |
| | 26 - 30 | 22 | 27.5 |
| | 31 - 35 | 20 | 25 |
| | 36 ans above | 17 | 21.3 |
| | | | |
| Education Level | Primary | 37 | 46.2 |
| | Secondary | 23 | 28.8 |
| | Diploma | 13 | 16.2 |
| | Degree | 7 | 8.8 |

Source: Author 2024

Table 4.1.1 shows the respondents' general information. The table shows that 45 (56.2%) of the respondents were male and 35 (43.8%) were female. This implies that there was no bias in selecting the gender of respondents while in the field since both male and female are represented accordingly.

Table 4.1.1 shows that 26.2% of the respondents were below 25 years, 27.5% were in the range of 26-30, 25% of the respondents were above 36 and above years. This implies that most of the respondents were averagely included in the sample since they are represented as stipulated in the sampling frame. Thus showing the degree of equality among different age groups.

Also, table 4.1.1 shows that 46.2% of the respondents had primary level of education, 28.8% of the respondents had secondary level, 16.2% of the respondents had Diploma and 8.8% of the respondents had Degree level of education. This means that most of the people in Mbale from the selected sub counties have primary level of education compared to other levels. Therefore, the level of education in the district is still at the substantive stage since diploma and bachelor's degree holders were few in the current study.

4.2 Distribution of Bribery frequencies in relation to Social Service Delivery

To determine the relationship between bribe and social service delivery was the first objective of this study the relationship was determined using a 4-Likert scale with five statements.

Table 4.2.1: Bribery Frequencies

| | | Responses | | Percentage of the class |
|------------------|-------------------|------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Relationship | | Number | Percentage | |
| between | strongly Disagree | 123 | 30.8% | 153.8% |
| Bribery and | Disagree | 122 | 30.5% | 152.0% |
| service delivery | Agree | 79 | 19.8% | 98.8% |
| | strongly Agree | 76 | 19.8% | 95.0% |
| TOTAL | | 400 | 100.0% | 500.0% |

a. Group and SSD represents social service delivery

Table 4.2.1 shows the responses about frequencies of bribery among the respondents. The respondents in the sampling frame were 80 in total with the corresponding number of respondents of 400 about the Likert scale measurement. Table 4.2.1 shows that 123 (30.8%) respondents were

in line with those respondents who strongly disagreed the statements, 122 (30.5%) respondents disagreed that there is relationship between Bribe and social service delivery, 79 (19.8%) respondents agreed and only 76 (19.0%) respondents strongly agreed that there is relationship between social service delivery and bribery. Generally, most of the people disagreed (61.3%) had respondents that mostly disagreed statements about bribery.

4.3 Distribution of Favoritism frequencies in relation to Social Service delivery

To determine the relationship between favouritism and social service delivery was the secondly objective of this study. The relationship was determined using a 4-Likert scale with five statements.

Table 4.3.1; Favouritism Frequencies

| | | Responses | | Percentage of the class |
|---|-------------------|------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| | | Number | Percentage | |
| Relationship between Favouritism and service delivery | strongly Disagree | 126 | 31.5% | 157.5% |
| | Disagree | 115 | 28.8% | 143.8% |
| | Agree | 90 | 22.5% | 112.5% |
| | strongly Agree | 69 | 17.2% | 86.2% |
| TOTAL | | 400 | 100.0% | 500.0% |

Table 4.3.1 shows the frequencies of respondents about of favouritism. The respondents in the sampling frame were 80 in total with the corresponding number of respondents of 400 about the Likert scale measurement. 60.3% of the respondents disagreed that there is relationship between favouritism and social service delivery whereas only 39.7% of the respondents agreed the statements about favouritism and social service delivery.

4.4 Distribution of Favoritism frequencies in relation to Social Service delivery

To determine the relationship between nepotism and social service delivery was the third objective of this study. The relationship was determined using a 4-Likert scale with five statements.

Table 4.4.1: Nepotism Frequencies

| Relationship | | Responses | | Percentage of the class |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-----------|------------|-------------------------|
| | | Number | Percentage | |
| between | strongly Disagree | 111 | 27.8% | 138.8% |
| Nepotism and service delivery | Disagree | 89 | 22.2% | 111.2% |
| | Agree | 114 | 28.5% | 142.5% |
| | strongly Agree | 84 | 21.5% | 107.5% |
| TOTAL | | 400 | 100.0% | 500.0% |

Table 4.4.1 shows the responses about frequencies of nepotism among the respondents. The respondents in the sampling frame were 80 in total with the corresponding number of respondents of 400 about the Likert scale measurement. 50% of the respondents disagreed that there is relationship between nepotism and social service delivery whereas also 50% of the respondents agreed the statements about nepotism and social service delivery. This implies that Nepotism have got equal effects that is negative and positive ones towards social service delivery in Mbale district.

4.5 Effect of Corruption on Social Service Delivery

To examine the effect of corruption on the social service delivery was the main objective of this study. This was done using the regression analysis whereby the indicators or forms of corruption (bribe, favouritism and nepotism) were transformed using SPSS to form one data set about corruption. Also, the indicators about social service delivery (health, transportation and education) were transformed to form a single dataset about social services delivery level.

Table 4.5.1: Model Summary

| Model | R | R square | Adjusted R | Std Error of the Estimate |
|-------|-------|----------|------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | 0.187 | 0.035 | 0.023 | 0.599 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), Social service delivery

Table 4.5.1 shows the model summary of the variable in the study. The R-Square is 0.035 which means that the variation of social service delivery being impacted by the corruption is 3.5%. This implies that there are several other factors that affect social service delivery were not included in the study due to the lowest value of R-square of 0.035.

Table 4.5.2: ANOVA a

| Model | sum of squares | Df | Mean square | F | significance |
|------------|----------------|----|-------------|-------|--------------|
| Regression | 1.016 | 1 | 1.016 | 2.832 | .096p |
| Residual | 27.972 | 78 | 0.359 | | |
| Total | 28.988 | 79 | | | |

a. Dependent Variable: Social service delivery

b. Predictors: (Constant), corruption

Table 4.5.2 shows the ANOVA table about the variables in the study. Given H_0 : the model is not significant; the criterion is that reject the null hypothesis when $F_{\text{computed}} > F_{\text{tabulated}}$ at 5% level of significance. From the above output, the $F (2.832)$ which is less than the tabulated $f (1, 79 = 4.0012)$. Thus, H_0 was accepted. This implies that the model was not statistically significant implying that there are other factors other than corruption that determines the level of social service delivery in Mbale district

Table 4.5.3: Coefficients a

| Model | | Unstandardised coefficient | Standardised coefficient | t | significance |
|------------|-------|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------|--------------|
| | B | Std Error | Beta | | |
| (constant) | 1.829 | 0.128 | | 14.317 | 0 |
| Corruption | 0.333 | 0.198 | 0.187 | 1.683 | 0.096 |

a. Dependent Variable: social service delivery

Table 4.5.3 elaborates the coefficients of social service delivery and corruption. The linear regression equation of variables in the study is indicated as below;

$$\text{Social Service Delivery} = 1.829 - 0.333 \text{ Corruption}$$

The above model is interpreted as; when there is no corruption in Mbale district, the level of social service delivery is 1.829 units. But a unit change in corruption leads to the reduction of level of social service delivery by 0.333 units. Generally, there is a negative relationship between corruption and social service delivery.

Also, by considering the Sig value, H_0 : variable is not significant. The criterion is that when the sig value is less than the level of significance (5%), reject the null hypothesis. From the above ANOVA table, the sig value is 0.096 which is greater than 0.05 thus accepting the null hypothesis. This implies that corruption is not significant enough to determine the level of social service delivery in Mbale district. This means that there are other several factors that affect social service delivery. These factors may include; government policies of decentralization, climatic changes among others.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the Discussion, conclusions about the objectives of the study and the recommendations.

5.1 Summary of Findings

The study aimed at examining the impact of corruption on social services delivery in Mbale district local government. The specific objectives of the study were; to examine the relationship between bribe and service delivery in Mbale district local, government, to find out the relationship between nepotism and service delivery in Mbale district local government and to establish the relationship between Favouritism and service delivery in Mbale district local government.

5.1.1 Relationship between Bribe and Social Service Delivery

Most of the respondents agreed bribe is the most form of corruption practiced in Mbale district. They were strongly sure that bribe is always in form of little subscriptions to the government offices in order to get social services in turn. Most of civil servants also said that bribe, favouritism and nepotism create differences between leaders and the people in the community.

The results showed that greater portions responses were in line with those respondents who strongly disagreed the statements, moderate portion of respondents disagreed that there was relationship between Bribe and social service delivery. Generally, most of the respondents disagreed the statements about bribery.

5.1.2 Relationship between favouritism and Social Service Delivery

The study showed that most of the respondents disagreed that there was relationship between favouritism and social service delivery whereas only few respondents agreed the statements about favouritism and social service delivery.

5.1.3 Relationship between nepotism and Social Service Delivery

The findings indicated that average number of respondents disagreed that there is relationship between nepotism and social service delivery as well as the equivalent respondents agreed the statements about nepotism and social service delivery. This implies that Nepotism have got equal effects that is negative and positive ones towards social service delivery in Mbale district. This means nepotism moderately affect the social service delivery of Mbale District Local Government.

5.1.4 The Effect of Corruption on Social Services Delivery

The findings showed was low variation of social service delivery being impacted by the corruption by 3.5%. This implies that there existed several other factors that affect social service delivery were not included in the study due to the lowest value of R-square. Such factors may include climatic conditions, level of education among the residents of the district among others.

The findings showed the model was not statistically significant implying that there are other factors other than corruption that determines the level of social service delivery in Mbale district.

The results elaborated that; when there was no corruption in Mbale district, the level of social service delivery was at the specified constant units but a unit change in corruption led to the reduction of level of social service delivery. Generally, there was a negative relationship between corruption and social service delivery. This means that when corruption mci eases among the people in the community, social service delivery automatically drops

The study found out that corruption was not significant enough to determine the level of social service delivery in Mbale district. This means that there are other several factors that affect social service delivery. These factors may include; government policies of decentralization, climatic changes level of education, health status of the individuals among others.

5.2 Discussions

According to Keefer and Khemani (2005) political or favoritism bring societal imperfections.

Three types of imperfections in the relationships between politicians and citizens: a lack of credibility in the political promises politicians make to citizens; a lack of information among voters about politicians' performance; and forms of social fragmentation among voters that can manifest as identity politics. While constrained to some degree by the nature of a secondary review of existing sources, we can identify a number of examples of these imperfections playing out. In a sense, this is unsurprising, as all political markets are imperfect to some degree; however, what is important to note is the level of these imperfections and the extent to which they become detrimental to effective service delivery

According to Hailey (2016) the two of the destroying agents of our country is favouritism and bribe. It is staring in our faces while we stand by, frozen in the hard ice of favouritism and we think it is just so cool. Is corruption so rampant due to favouritism if so, where does it so, this article is not intended to be a scholarly work on the ethnology of favouritism, nor is it a thesis on creating a non-violent environment. It is just a friendly conversation to provide clear evidence towards favouritism and bribe in relation to social service delivery.

According to Mukasa (2017) nepotism increases poverty by slowing economic growth, skewing government expenditure in favour of the rich and well-connected, concentrating public investment in unproductive projects, promoting a more regressive tax system, siphoning funds away from essential public services, adding a higher level of risk to the investment decisions of low-income individuals, and reinforcing patterns of unequal asset ownership, thereby limiting the ability of the poor to borrow and increase their income (Mukasa,201 7).

Generally, the theory which relates the variables in the study is the “The Theory of Planned

Behaviour” (TPB) developed by leek Ajzen in 1980 started as the Theory of Reasoned Action in 1980 to predict an individual's intention to engage in a behaviour at a specific time and place. The theory was intended to explain all behaviours over which people have the ability to exert self-control. The key component to this model is behavioural intent; behavioural intentions are influenced by the attitude about the likelihood that the behaviour will have the expected outcome and the subjective evaluation of the risks and benefits of that outcome. This is because most of the

people to engage in corruption depend on the individual's intention and goals to participate into a certain activity such as corruption.

5.3 Conclusions

The study concluded that most of the respondents the household heads and the civil servants agreed that bribe are the most form of corruption practiced in Mbale district. They were strongly sure that bribe is always in form of little subscriptions to the government offices in order to get social services in turn. Most of civil servants also said that bribe, favouritism and nepotism create differences between leaders and the people in the community.

The study also concluded that leaders in the district favors the sub counties of their interests in delivering social services such as health services, transport services and education services.

The study also concluded that the respondents strongly that bribe was always in form of little subscriptions to the government offices in order to get social services in turn. Most of civil servants also said that bribe, favouritism and nepotism create differences between leaders and the people in the community.

Furthermore, the study concluded that there existed favouritism among the of sub counties in terms of service delivery. Social services such as transport, health and education services are distributed in relation to the favours and sub counties of interest.

The research dissertation also found out that there was a negative relationship between conuption and social services delivery in Mbale district local government. This implies that as corruption increases at the local governments, the level of service delivery is reduced in different communities.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings that corruption levels are on an upward trend, timely and effective measures

need to be taken so as to could be the upward corruption trend The researcher recommends a study be carried out to assess the effectiveness of the corruption measures that have been put in place Accountability deters corruption hence, the mechanisms to foster accountability should be severe enough to deter corrupt practices This will ensure that the new institutions established and reorganized ministries will not inherit the corruption networks but rather, corruption will be curbed before it can spill over.

The researcher recommends the government to always carry out departmental performance reviews. Departmental performance collectively yields the ministerial performance and hence measure of service delivery. Also, the departmental corruption levels collectively contribute into the ministerial corruption index. Therefore, it is paramount that the performance of each department is monitored and ensured to improve so as to guarantee improved overall performance of the ministry in service delivery.

The evaluation of the land administration processes indicated that the processes are: long centralized and complex, while some of the officers have monopoly with a lot of discretion powers. Monopoly and discretion acts as incentives for corrupt practices. While, long, centralized and complex processes create loopholes for corrupt practices to thrive.

The researcher recommends that the ministry carries an assessment of the procedures/processes with the aim of identifying loopholes and weakness that foster corruption and undermine efficient and effective service delivery.

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Appendix C: Work Plan

| DETAILS | PERIOD | | | | | |
|---|--------|-----|------|-----|-------|-------|
| | 2023 | | 2024 | | | |
| | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | MARCH | APRIL |
| Identification of research topic and approval | █ | | | | | |
| Writing chapter one, two and three. | | | █ | | | |
| Designing questionnaire | | | | | █ | |
| Research proposal submission | | | | | | █ |

Appendix D: Proposed Budget

| NO. | PARTICULAR | QUANTITY | PRICE | AMOUNT |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1 | Transport to | 2 times | 25000 | 50,000 |
| 2 | Supervision fee | 1 | 70,000 | 70,000 |
| 3 | Stationary (Ruled papers) | 1 ream | 17,000 | 17,000 |
| 4 | Pens | 2pieces | 1000 | 2000 |
| 5 | Break and lunch | | 5000 | 50,000 |
| 6 | Typesetting, printing and binding | 1 copy | | 60,000 |
| TOTAL | | | | 264,000 |